A Convenient Path for the Brazilian Branches of Government: Executive Supremacy by Bolonha, Carlos
A CONVENIENT PATH FOR THE BRAZILIAN BRANCHES OF 
GOVERNMENT: EXECUTIVE SUPREMACY* ** 
 
 
Initial Considerations 
Studies of the separation of powers in presidential regimes have suggested a 
supremacy of the executive branch.1 Throughout North America, this supremacy 
stems from crisis or calamity situations;2 in Brazil, however, it is uninterrupted, and 
independent of any extraordinary events.3 The supremacy of the Brazilian executive 
branch stems from the convenience status of the other branches, which fail to or are 
unable to constrain the executive expansion. In addition, the historical and political 
factors, the constitutional design and the proactivity expected of the executive branch 
add to this inability. Some examples include constitutional amendments (CAs) and 
provisional measures (PMs), which this study uses to demonstrate that showdowns 
are avoided for the convenience of the branches, but the consequence of their 
avoidance is the supremacy of the executive.4 Progressive CAs produced by the 
executive with little risk of legislative rejection and judicial control over the 
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1 The dominance of the executive is a particular feature of presidential regimes. From a post-
Madisonian perspective, given some of the inter-branch showdowns and economic and political crises, 
the executive appears to have assumed a "super-activist" status. 
2 The crises are significant because fundamental institutional reforms take place over a brief time even 
as existing institutions struggle to fulfill their mandate. Sometimes, the existing institutions simply 
claim more power than they were understood to have. At other times, Congress rouses itself to act, but 
only to confirm a seizure of power or discretion by the executive, or to impart vast new powers. 
POSNER, Eric A. VERMEULE, Adrian. The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic. 
Oxford University Press: New York, 2010, p. 32.	  
3 While Brazil boasts an apparent judicial supremacy, whether through expressions that attempt to 
reiterate the prominence of the judiciary as "having the last word," the "last guardian of the 
Constitution," among others—or by statements from various authorities, including the President, in 
which the executive has shown sufficient capacity to avoid the final decisions of the Supreme Court,  
specifically in some cases of federal tax matters. 
4 Episodes of confrontation between the institutions in a given context. 
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provisional measures are political-juridical maneuvers to maintain inter-branch pax 
while simultaneously promoting constitutional redesign. 
Liberal legalism fails when it assumes that the executive will submit to the 
rule of law. In the case of the American Administrative State, party politics 5 and 
public opinion6 clearly play decisive roles in constraining the executive branch. The 
Brazilian "State of Convenience," however, has not yet fully overcome its nearly two-
hundred-year-old authoritarian and interventionist tradition. Even after the adoption 
of the 1988 Constitution, both the legislature and the judiciary as well as, in some 
ways, the executive, fail to undertake their minimum required institutional roles.7 
Moreover, the Brazilian public is apathetic, with no well-defined public opinion, and 
rarely intervenes in governmental dynamics. 
The present study aims to demonstrate that the Brazilian executive is an 
expanded branch that bypasses the formal distribution of constitutional competences 
and is supported, at the convenience of the other branches, through the use of 
constitutional instruments such as constitutional amendments and provisional 
measures that suit (i) the maintenance of an executive supremacy and governance, (ii) 
an uninterrupted constitutional redesign and (iii) the prospect of continuous 
constitutional emergency. 
The Redesign of the Constitution: Constitutional Amendments 
Despite the fact that amendments to the constitution have a high political 
cost,8 in both the Brazilian and American contexts, a significant number have been 
proposed by the Brazilian executive during the two presidential terms of Fernando 
                                                            
5 “Partisanship undermines the separation of powers during periods of unified government.” POSNER, 
E.; VERMEULE, A. op. Cit. p., 27; LEVINSON, Daryl J.; PILDES, Richard H. “Separation of 
Parties, Not Powers.” Harvard Law Review, 2006	  
6 POSNER, E.; VERMEULE, A. op. cit., p. 4.	  
7 This problem stems from a failure of the mutual control mechanisms (checks and balances) and, ipso 
facto, the rule of law. 	  
8 Art. 60 of the Brazilian Constitution provides for the legitimate proposal of amendments to the 
Constitution by the following: a) at least one third of either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate 
members (the two parliamentary houses at the federal level), b) the President of the Republic, or c) 
more than half of the legislative assemblies of the federated states. The proposal must be examined by 
two chamber committees and then by the plenary, undergoing two rounds of voting, each of which 
requires three fifths of the votes for approval. Once approved in the chamber, the proposal is sent to the 
Senate, and examined by a committee and by the plenary, undergoing two rounds of voting, each of 
which requires three fifths of the votes for approval. Once approved by both houses, the proposal is 
promulgated by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate Boards (management bodies) and published in 
the official dissemination media when it comes into force. 
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Henrique Cardoso (FHC) (1995–2002), a member of the Brazilian Social Democracy 
Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira - PSDB). However, the number of 
amendment proposals by the executive branch decreased after the ascension of the 
Workers Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT)—Lula (2003–2010) and Dilma 
(2011–2013)—to the presidency. This reduction was due to a decrease in partisan 
coalescence (internal cohesion) despite an increase in the government base’s 
coalition. 
 
Composition of the National Congress9 
Base Opposition 
Period Chamber Senate Chamber Senate 
1995–98 181 35.28% 34 41.98% 93 18.13% 7 8.64% 
1999–02 303 59.06% 41 50.62% 109 21.25% 12 14.81% 
2003–06 254 49.51% 31 38.27% 259 50.49% 50 61.73% 
2007–10 353 68.81% 49 60.49% 160 31.19% 32 39.51% 
2011–12 373 72.71% 62 76.54% 111 21.64% 18 22.22% 
Assessing the level of governance largely depends on the presence of 
coalescence and not just on a partisan coalition. Although the PT governments 
formally formed coalitions that were numerically superior to those of the opposition, 
they lacked coalescence, creating a less unified government. Conversely, coalescence 
                                                            
9 Considering the alliances for electoral support during the 1995–98 and 1999–02 periods, which were 
as follows: the PSDB, PFL [Partido da Frente Liberal/Liberal Front Party] and PTB [Partido 
Trabalhista Brasileiro/Brazilian Labor Party] and the PSDB, PFL, PPB [Partido Progressita 
Brasileiro/Brazilian Progressive Party], PTB and PSD [Partido Social Democrático/Social Democratic 
Party] (base), and the PT, PSB [Partido Socialista Brasileiro/Brazilian Socialist Party], PC of B 
[Partido Comunista do Brasil/Communist Party of Brazil], PPS [Partido Popular Socialista/Popular 
Socialist Party], PV [Partido Verde/Green Party] and PSTU [Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores 
Unificado/United Socialist Workers' Party] and the PT, PDT [Partido Democrático 
Trabalhista/Democratic Labor Party], PSB, PC do B and PCB [Partido Comunista Brasileiro/Brazilian 
Communist Party] (opposition). The PMDB [Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro/Brazilian 
Social Democracy Party] representatives were not aligned because they lacked uniformity of support or 
a base. From 2003–07 the support base consisted of the PT, PL [Partido Liberal/Liberal Party], PSB, 
PTB, PDT, PPS [Partido Popular Socialista /Popular Socialist Party], PC of B, PV, PMN [Partido da 
Mobilização Nacional/Party of National Mobilization], PSD, PST [Partido Socialista dos 
Trabalhadores/Socialist Workers Party], PSL [Partido Social Liberal/Social Liberal Party] and PSDC 
[Partido Social Democrata Cristão/Christian Social Democratic Party]; and the opposition was 
composed of the DEM [Democratas/Democrats] (formerly PFL), PMDB [Partido do Movimento 
Democrático Brasileiro/Brazilian Democratic Movement Party], PSDB, PP [Partido 
Progressista/Progressive Party], Prona [Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional/Party of the 
Reconstruction of the National Order] and PSC [Partido Social Cristão/Social Christian Party]. From 
2007–2010 the support base consisted of the PT, PMDB, PP, PR [Partido da República/Party of the 
Republic] (resulting from the merger of PL and Prona), PSB, PTB, PDT, PC of B, PV, PSC and PRB 
[Partido Republicano Brasileiro/Brazilian Republican Party]; and the opposition was composed of the 
PSDB, DEM, PPS, PSOL [Partido Socialismo e Liberdade/Socialism and Freedom Party], PMN and 
PTC [Partido Trabalhista Cristão / Christian Labor Party]. From 2011–12 the support base was 
composed of the PT, PMDB, PR, PDT, PSB, PC of B, PRB, PSC, PP and PTB; and the opposition 
consisted of the PSDB, DEM, PPS and PSOL. 
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was present in the PSDB governments in which the addition of a few independent 
parties in the Congress was sufficient for approving political programs, creating a 
more unified government. 
These changes led to a reduction in the use of formal amendments to the 
Constitution, the procedures for which are relatively cumbersome. 
 
Therefore, the government base lost its qualified majority in the Congress, 
transitioning to a less unified government. The governance by the executive branch, 
however, was not severely impaired because the executive could conveniently dismiss 
constitutional amendments using lower-cost mechanisms. Legislation initiated by the 
executive branch peaked in 2004 following the loss of a qualified majority. 
 
Moreover, the executive branch already had the power of provisional 
measures, which do not require legislative intervention for immediate action. 
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According to this hypothesis, the legislative allocation of provisional measures does 
not stem from a showdown, crisis or delegation, but from a de jure primary 
constitutional provision. 
The Legal Redesign: Provisional Measures 
The Brazilian executive plays an atypical legislative function through 
regulatory decrees and delegated laws. Both require a priori legislative intervention 
by issuing legislation that lacks regulation and a posteriori legislative intervention by 
approving delegated laws. Moreover, the executive has the power to propose laws—
which represent 80% of the ordinary Brazilian legislation10—and constitutional 
amendments. However, the provisional measures represent primary normative acts 
with immediate legal efficacy, submitted for subsequent assessment by the Congress. 
The executive plays a role equal to that of the legislators in these cases. 
The Constitution provides that "[i]n case of relevance and urgency, the 
President of the Republic may adopt provisional measures with the force of law, and 
shall immediately submit them to Congress." If examined by the Congress, a simple 
majority is sufficient to convert a provisional measure into law.11 If rejected or voided 
in practice due to a lapse in time,12 the legal relations both constituted and resulting 
from any acts performed during its validity shall be governed by them, according to 
                                                            
10 Article 47 of the Constitution stipulates that the deliberations of each house and its committees shall 
be taken by a majority vote, provided the presence of an absolute majority of its members. Thus, for 
the approval of an ordinary law in the Senate, which is composed of 81 members, 21 votes in favor are 
required, highlighting the ease of the procedure as compared with constitutional amendments, which 
require a three-fifths majority of the parliamentarians for approval (in the Senate, 49 votes out of the 81 
senators).   
11 In agreement with articles 84, subsection XXVI, and 62 and paragraphs of the 1988 Constitution, the 
President of the republic has the exclusive responsibility to issue provisional measures (PMs). Such 
norms have the force of ordinary law, upon publication, although the President must immediately 
submit them to the National Congress for examination. Once sent to the Congress, the PM will be 
examined by a joint committee of deputies and senators, which shall provide an opinion regarding its 
constitutionality. Later, the PM will be submitted to a vote by the plenary of each house, starting with 
the chamber, and will be approved by a simple majority in both plenaries, being thus converted into 
law. The PMs can be approved and converted into law within a maximum of sixty days, which is 
extendable for only one equal period. If this limit is exceeded, the PM becomes void dated to its 
issuing. The Congress can adopt four attitudes when analyzing a PM: (a) approve it without changes; 
b) approve it with amendments to the text prepared by the presidency of the republic; (c) not examine 
the PM within the maximum time limit; or d) reject the PM. If the Congress does not examine or 
rejects the PM, a legislative decree must be promulgated, regulating the legal relations brought about 
by the PM, for the period in which it was effective. If the parliamentarians do not issue this legislative 
decree until sixty days after the PM becomes valid, those legal relations will be governed by the 
unexamined or rejected PM itself, providing the executive with a preponderance of will if the 
Parliament does not pronounce itself.	  
12 In this case, a legislative decree is rarely issued by the parliament.	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the determinations of the executive. 
However, "relevance" and "urgency" are not required of the legislative or 
judicial examination. The convenience of passing provisional measures is largely 
justified by the institutional capacities of the executive, which are higher than those 
of the National Congress. However, this convenience essentially results from the 
potential risk and burden that might arise from the possible showdown upon rejection 
of the measures. 
 
 
As shown in the above figure, the legislative branch converted 87% of the 
provisional measures into law. Moreover, the 32nd constitutional amendment ratified 
in 2001, though originally conceived to constrain the issuance of provisional 
measures, was approved after expanding the executive discretion provided therein. 
The PMs could therefore be considered a constitutional evil that many people regard 
as necessary or positive, although it is a constitutional imperfection.13 
The executive has made use of provisional measures even when their 
consequent constitutional redesigns violate the permitted constitutional limits, which 
not only violates the separation of powers, but the Constitution itself; art. 62, § 1, I, d, 
provides that it is forbidden to issue provisional measures on matters related to 
budgets and additional or supplementary credits, except for, pursuant to art. 167, to 
meet unforeseeable and urgent expenses, such as those resulting from war, internal 
commotion or public calamity. 
                                                            
13 GRABER, Mark. Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil. Cambridge University 
Press: New York, 2006, p. 9.	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However, as shown in the following figure the values of the aforementioned 
expenses surpass any concept of extraordinariness. 
 
The path convenient for the branches also has implications with respect to 
judicial convenience. The Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF) 
has repeatedly held that it is not competent to assess "relevance" and "urgency,"14 a 
pre-requisite for the issuance of PMs. Moreover, when consulted on the opening of 
extraordinary credits, the STF has stated that "the foreseen credits have either been 
used or lost their validity, and therefore, no emendable situations subsist at the present 
time."15 
In another example, in the judgment of the direct action of unconstitutionality 
4029/AM (03/2012), the STF "backed out"16 one day after a decision that declared the 
formal unconstitutionality of the provisional measure that created the Chico Mendes 
Institute (Instituto Chico Mendes) due to a procedural flaw in the examination of the 
measure by the Congress following a point of order raised by the Attorney General of 
the Union, a representative of the executive. By sweeping unconstitutionalities under 
the rug, the STF attributed the potential effects to the decision, which threatened 500 
                                                            
14 Thus, the following should be noted: (i) "The understanding of this Court is that examination of 
urgency and importance requirements can only be submitted to the judiciary when there is abuse of 
discretion by the head of the executive branch. Regimental appeal that shall be withheld" (AI 489108, 
2006); (ii) the "relevance and urgency requirements for issuing provisional measure are a 
discretionary power of the head of the executive branch, hence should not be examined by the judiciary 
branch , except in the case of a misuse of power. Understanding decided upon STF jurisprudence. 
Action dismissed" (ADI 2150, 2002). 
15 ADI nº 4.041, 2011.	  
16 “The Switch in Time that Saved Eleven.” The radical change in the STF behavior is similar to that of 
the US Supreme Court in 1937, after the failed court-packing plan of President Roosevelt.	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prior provisional measures.17 
The status quo of a "permanent crisis" and 400 claims of relevance and 
urgency between 2003 and 2011 have prevented showdowns, eventual crises, higher 
lawmaking or even judicial doctrine.18 The Brazilian "state of convenience" thus 
surpasses the administrative state, though it does not necessarily make the executive 
more effective. The continuous constitutional emergency, which derives from the 
executive convenience and connivance, negates all other branches, causing them to be 
frequently ignored and reserved. 
 
Final Considerations 
One can conclude that the supremacy of the Brazilian executive branch also 
stems from the convenience of the other branches, a condition that avoids institutional 
crises or confrontations. The present study presented two constitutional instruments, 
constitutional amendments and provisional measures, that demonstrate those 
relationships of convenience and the prestige enjoyed by the executive. The executive 
has progressively and conveniently reduced the number constitutional amendments, 
given the political burden of a formal constitutional amendment and the loss of a 
qualified majority in the government base. However, the low-cost political tools 
remain in use to preserve governance. The other branches rarely interfere with 
provisional measures to avoid constitutional showdowns. The judiciary does not 
precisely define relevance and urgency, abstaining itself from examining the 
constitutionality of most provisional measures, and eventually modulates the effects 
of its own decisions, making them "more beneficial" to the executive. Likewise, the 
legislature ratifies the legislative assignment to the executive, converting provisional 
measures into law and approving executive initiatives. Thus, the Brazilian executive 
not only enjoys supremacy due to the convenience of the other branches but also 
conveniently preserves the existence of these branches. 
                                                            
17 “We have found that, in spite of declaring the measures unconstitutional, it could generate a serious 
social crisis of legal uncertainty and institutional crises, indicating that we should be careful with the 
consequences of our decision” (Luiz Fux – Brazilian Supreme Court Justice).	  
18 “We suggest that the central mechanism of constitutional change is not amendment, higher 
lawmaking or even judicial doctrine, but episodes of conflict between institutions over the distribution 
of policymaking authority.” POSNER, E.; VERMEULE, A. op. Cit. p. 67.	  
